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This paper extends the stabilization game between monetary and fiscal 
authorities to the case of multiplicative (model) uncertainty. In this context, 
the “symbiosis assumption”, i.e. fiscal and monetary policy share the same 
ideal targets, no longer guarantees the achievement of ideal output and 
inflation, unless the ideal output is equal to its natural level. A time 
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About forty years ago, William Brainard (1967) showed that multiplicative 
(model) uncertainty affects policy-makers’ behavior and makes them more 
cautious, in the sense that they react less sharply to disturbances.
1 More 
recently, a number of authors have attempted to highlight the importance of 
multiplicative uncertainty by introducing it into models of optimal monetary 
policy (see, for example, Estrella and Mishkin, 1999; Peersman and Smets, 
1999; Svensson, 1999; Rudebusch, 2001 and 2002; Giannoni, 2002; Lawler, 
2002; Schellekens, 2002; Söderström, 2002; Walsh, 2003: Section 4). 
Although Brainard’s claims are general, to the best of our knowledge no 
similar exercises have been made for fiscal policy. Acknowledging the 
relevance of uncertainty for the effects of policy-makers’ choices, this paper 
aims to evaluate the consequences which are produced on the effects of fiscal 
policy by the introduction of multiplicative uncertainty in a class of policy 
games recently developed by Dixit and Lambertini (D&L from now 
onward).
2  
D&L’s models have two interesting features which make them particular 
attractive for policy investigations: a) they are general equilibrium 
(micro)-founded models based on monopolistic competition; b) they consider 
both fiscal and monetary stabilization policies. They are hence useful to study 
the interaction between fiscal and monetary authorities in a New Keynesian 
                                                 
1  See also Holly and Hughes Hallett (1989: 64-67) for a comprehensive description of 
multiplicative uncertainty and a comparison with additive uncertainty (i.e. information 
uncertainty). 
2 See D&L (2001, 2003a, and 2003b.) See also Lambertini (2004).  
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framework. In their models, D&L highlight that, since a linear structure for 
shocks is rather restrictive and thus unsatisfactory, it is preferable to assume 
that the private sector forms its expectations on non-linear structure shocks. 
In other words, D&L claim that additive uncertainty is a very restrictive case 
and model multiplicative uncertainty. Policy-makers observe all the shocks.  
In this set up, D&L (2003b) show that if the symbiosis assumption holds, i.e., 
fiscal and monetary authorities share identical output and inflation targets 
(but not necessary equal trade-offs between these objectives), ideal output 
and inflation can be always achieved. Although this result is obtained in a 
monetary union, it holds also in a single country (for a discussion, see 
Lambertini, 2004).
3  D&L (2001) also discuss the different results which 
obtain when symbiosis does not hold.  
In this paper, we are particularly interested in the effects of uncertainty on the 
outcomes associated with the symbiosis assumption. Following recent 
developments in the literature, we insert multiplicative uncertainty
4 in the 
effects of policy-makers’ actions. In this case, we show that uncertainty may 
be no longer neutral (for average outcomes) and imply different results. In 
particular, the symbiosis assumption does not guarantee the achievement of 
ideal output and inflation unless the ideal real output is also equal to its 
natural level. Thus, a time consistency problem arises – differently from the 
perfect information case. The existence of a time consistency problem also 
implies that monetary and fiscal authorities have to be more conservative than 
                                                 
3 For the sake of brevity, we will only consider the case of a single country; results can be 
easily extended to a monetary union but we leave this task to further researches. 
4 Of course, by assuming additive uncertainty, it is trivial to show that D&L’s results on 
fiscal-monetary interactions hold in expected terms, because of the certainty equivalence. It 
is worth recalling that all the models discussed are linear-quadratic games.  
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the society in order to minimize a micro-founded social welfare loss.  
For the sake of simplicity, we restrict ourselves to the case of multiplicative 
uncertainty on the inflationary effects of fiscal policy in the case of 
simultaneous interactions between fiscal and monetary authority (the D%L 
basis case). Robustness of our results to different multiplicative uncertainty 
and game timing is however discussed. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes our 
single-country version of D&L (2003b) model where policy-makers are not 
perfectly informed about all the shocks. Section 3 studies the effects of 
multiplicative uncertainty, reports on our results, and briefly discusses their 
robustness. Section 4 tackles the issue of the optimal design of institutions by 
looking for the government’s and central bank’s degree of conservativeness 
that maximizes social welfare. The final section concludes.  
 
2. The economic benchmark 
The policy-makers’ expected losses, which depend on the deviations of 
inflation (π ) and real output ( y ) from common targets, π
∗  and  y
∗ (i.e. 
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=− + −   for  { } iG B ∈ ,   
where  G L  and  B L  indicate the government’s and central bank’s preferences 
and  G θ  and  B θ  are the government’s and central bank’s marginal rate of 
substitution between inflation and real output deviations from the target 
expressed in terms of inflation, respectively. Note that the symbiosis  
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assumption does not imply equal marginal rate of substitutions between the 
two policy-makers. We assume  BG θ θ ≤ , i.e. a conservative central bank.
5  
The economic model is given by the two following equations: 
(2) 
e yyb a x ππ
⎛⎞
⎜⎟
⎝⎠ =+ − +  
(3)  0 cx π πµ =+   
where  y  is the natural level of real output, 
e π  are is private sector expected 
inflation, and x and  0 π  are fiscal and monetary policy indicators. As usual, 
we assume that, due to distortions in the good markets, the natural level of 
real output may be too low from a social point of view. This implies:  yy
∗ > . 
We assume that policy-makers cannot observe a multiplicative shock, i.e. 
2 1 µ µ σ
⎛⎞
⎜⎟
⎝⎠ , ∼   (for similar specifications, see, among others, Letterie, 1997; 
Pearce and Sobue, 1997; Lawler, 2002; Schellekens, 2002).
6 Note that the 
introduction of an additive shock does not affect the (average) outcome and 
the optimal policy of the model because of the linear-quadratic nature of the 
game.  




⎝⎠ −  is 
the usual supply effect of surprise inflation ( 0 b > ). The effect of fiscal policy 
on real output can be either positive, for Keynesian demand effects, or 
negative, for crowding out effects, but the algebra of the model is of course 
the same in the two cases. Inflation is described by equation (3) as the sum of 
                                                 
5 Cf. Rogoff (1985) and Lambertini (2004). 
6 For the sake of brevity, we here consider only a multiplicative shock on fiscal policy 
effectiveness, but the robustness of our results with respect to different stochastic structures 
will be discussed below.  
  6
a component controlled by the central bank,  0 π , and a further contribution 
arising from fiscal policy. This may be due to the fact that the central bank is, 
in practice, forced to accommodate fiscal expansion to some extent, or to a 
change in the equilibrium price of goods depending on the balance between 
the effects of fiscal policy on aggregate demand and on costs, produced by 
changes in tax distortions or public investment. Thus c can have either signs 
and for our scope we assume  0 c >  and  0 a > .
7  
By minimizing the government’s loss function with respect to the fiscal 
instrument subject to equations (2) and (3), we obtain the following first order 
condition: 
(4)  () 0 0 G Ec ac b y y µππ µ θ
⎡⎤ ∗∗ ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞
⎢⎥ ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎣⎦ −+ + − =  
In a similar manner we obtain the central bank’s first order condition: 
(5)  0 0 B Eb y y ππ θ
⎡⎤ ∗∗ ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞
⎢⎥ ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎣⎦ − +− =   
It should be noticed that the optimal monetary policy (equation (5)) is 
unaffected by multiplicative uncertainty. This is so because we have 
considered the Nash equilibrium and we assumed that the shock is only on the 
fiscal instrument.
8  
If the (multiplicative) shock is perfectly observed by both the central bank 
and the government, by use of equations (4) and (5) it is easy to verify that 
yy
∗ =  and π π
∗ =  , as the model collapses to D&L’s (2003b) one.
9  
 
                                                 
7 A detailed discussion of the model and of its micro-foundations is in D&L (2003a), (2003b) 
and in Lambertini (2004). Regarding the robustness of our results to different policy 
transmission mechanisms (signs), see Section 4. 
8 See the discussion on robustness in Section 4.  
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3. Shocks and symbiosis 
We now consider the case of an unknown shock. As we said above, optimal 
monetary policy is not affected by multiplicative uncertainty, whereas the 
government’s expected-reaction function can be re-written as: 
(6)  () ()() ()
22 2 1 G
GG
bc c
yE y E x












by considering that 
22 1 E µ µσ
⎡⎤
⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ =+ .
10  
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where  ( ) 1 0 GG B Aa a b c θθ θ
⎡⎤
⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ =+− >  and 
22
2 1 G Ab c θ
⎛⎞
⎜⎟
⎝⎠ =+ . Unless 
2 0 µ σ = , 
equations (7) and (8) imply a policy inconsistency problem, since 
policy-makers are not able to neutralize the private sector action. From 
equations (7) and (8) is clear that the symbiosis result holds if and only if 
either 
2 0 µ σ =  or  yy
∗ = . In other words, it holds if the policy-makers do not 
face multiplicative uncertainty (as in D&L, 2003b); or if there is not a policy 
inconsistency problem.  
                                                                                                                            
9 Indeed, if the multiplicative shocks are observed by both policy-makers. 
10  Note  that  () 1 E µ µ == and  ()
2 2
() E E
µ σ µµ = − ⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦ . Thus the variance is: 
[ ] [ ]
22 222 2 2 () 2 () 2 EE E E E
µ σµ µ µ µ µ µ µµ µ µ
⎡⎤
⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ =+− =+ −= − .  
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The rationale of the above result is driven by two forces: a strategic and an 
anticipation effect. First, multiplicative uncertainty on its policy makes the 
government more caution in reacting to the other variables and, therefore, in 
stabilizing the economy. A fiscal contraction thus stimulates monetary 
expansion since monetary and fiscal policies are substitutes.
11 For any level 
of price expectations, fiscal (monetary) policy is less (more) expansionary 
than in the perfect information case [strategic effect], where policies are 
consistent with the ideal outcome achievement. Moreover, the loose 
monetary policy stimulates price expectations that raise both monetary and 
fiscal policy [anticipation effect].
12  As result, in equilibrium, the ideal 
outcomes are not achieved; output and inflation are lower and higher, 
respectively, than the policy-makers’ ideal values since the fiscal and 
monetary policy mix no longer offsets the private sector behavior: a 
traditional inflation bias emerges.  
Figure 1 synthesizes the economic mechanism by comparing the uncertainty 
and the perfect information cases. BB represents the central bank’s reaction 
function (which is not affected by uncertainty),  1 AA  is the government’s 




                                                 
11 See the policy-makers’ reaction functions in the instrument space reported in Appendix A. 
12 Optimal policy implies equalization of marginal costs and benefits of an inflation increase. 
When expectations are high, the output is low. Thus the marginal gain of increasing inflation 
is also high because of policy-makers’ quadratic losses. Hence, higher expectations imply 
looser policies. See again the policy-makers’ reaction functions reported in Appendix A. 
13 Recall that, for 
C x x =  and  00
C π π = ,  yy
∗ =  and π π








For given private sector expectations, multiplicative uncertainty affects the 
slope of the government’s reaction function (from  1 AA  to  2 AA ), implying a 
tighter fiscal policy (
U x ) and a looser monetary policy ( 0
U π ), i.e., the strategic 
effect . Moreover, expected inflation associated with the pair (
U x ,  0
U π ) is 
higher than the expected inflation associated with (
C x ,  0
C π ).
14 Higher 
                                                 
14 In order to move from instruments to objectives, we need to draw equation (3) as the locus 
of inflation rates in the instrument space (dashed lines). This locus is represented by a set of 
parallel lines with a slope equal to  c −  and an intercept equal to the associated inflation. In 
the figure, higher dashed lines are associated with higher expected inflation rates. 
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expected inflation moves the reaction functions from  2 AA  to  AA
′′  and from 
BB to  B B
′′ , i.e. the anticipation effect, and partially offsets the strategic 
effect on output gap whereas straightens its effects on inflation. The Nash 




⎩⎭ =, .  
In the Nash equilibrium, N , inflation rises over its ideal values and output 
falls below it since we know from the perfect information solution that 
e
C π ππ
∗ ==  and  C ya x yy
∗ =+ = . Formally, under uncertainty fiscal policy 
is 
NC x x <  and 
e π π = , hence output is lower than in the perfect information 
case since it is completely determined by x (see equation (2)). Equilibrium 
inflation can be found by using equation (3) and its intercept on the 0 π  axis: 
since the dashed line passing for N  is higher than that passing from C , 
under uncertainty inflation is higher than in the perfect information case.  
Before considering more in detail the effects of policy-makers’ uncertainty 
on the effects of fiscal policy, we would like to briefly discuss the robustness 
of our results
15 since: a) under perfect information, the symbiosis result holds 
also for Stackelberg equilibria; b) a major drawback of the policy game 
approach is usually considered to be the lack of robustness.
16  
                                                 
15 For the sake of brevity, robustness is here only discussed in informal terms. Further results 
on other possible shock structure (including multiple correlated shocks) are available upon 
request from the authors. 
16 In other words, the conclusions reached are often sensitive to the particular assumptions 
adopted to model the games. Even though the argument raised by this criticism is important, 
it would be important to distinguish, as argued by Kreps (1990), between the assumptions 
which are made on the equilibrium concept and on the players’ preference functions which 
are used. Whereas the existence of different equilibrium concepts is a source of improvement 
for the “economic science”, their misuse is an impoverishment. Similarly, even though minor 
changes in the analytical model and in agents' preferences may result in quite different 
features in the performance of economic systems. This is in the nature of the economic  
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By a considering a comprehensive taxonomy, we find that our main result is 
rather general. In fact, the symbiosis assumption is not sufficient to guarantee 
the achievement of ideal outcomes for all the possible game timing and all the 
possible forms of multiplicative uncertainty (irrespectively of the parameter 
signs),
17   with the exception of a single non-correlated shock on the 
semi-elasticity of the inflation surprise term (i.e. a shock on b  in equation 
(2)).  
The reason of the above exception can be explained as follows. Multiplicative 
uncertainty influences the coefficient of the uncertain variables in the 
policy-makers’ first order conditions. Thus, in the case of multiplicative 
uncertainty on the impact of the inflation surprise (measured by b ), its effects 
on the policy-makers’ reactions are fully offset by the rationality of 
expectations, which implies a zero value for expected inflation surprise in 
equilibrium.  
In our discussion about robustness, we have only considered leadership 
equilibria (in the D&L’s terminology). Commitment is in fact not possible, 
either as state-contingent-linear or as non-linear rule, since the multiplicative 
shock is not observable by definition, being a shock on policy effects and not 
on the state of the economy. 
Summarizing, the symbiosis assumption is not sufficient to guarantee the 
achievement of ideal outcomes under a very general set of assumptions. 
However, it should be noticed that different assumptions entail quite different 
policy implications, which here are not fully discussed.
18   
                                                                                                                            
process: small changes often correspond to a mutation in the institutional setup. 
17 Thus it holds also under monetary policy uncertainty. 
18 In particular, different prescriptions arise from model uncertainty in monetary policy,  
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Some additional results can be easily derived by using comparative static 
exercises.
19 An  increase  in 
2
µ σ   is associated with higher inflation and 
unemployment. Moreover, an increase in the central bank’s degree of 
conservativeness raises output and reduces inflation, if  yy
∗ > . By contrast, a 
similar increase in the government’s degree of conservativeness produces 
opposite effects on both variables.  
The above result may have important policy implications for the design of 
institutions, in terms of target assignment or optimal policy mix, and for the 
recent debate about the conservative central banker. By assuming that it is 
optimal to minimize the average outcomes, in the symbiosis context with 
simultaneous policies, our model suggests that the optimal stabilization 
should imply a complete separation of task: The central bank should be 
interested only in inflation stabilization and the government in output 
stabilization.  
By considering a welfare-oriented criterion directly derived from the model 
micro-foundations, a similar result is also stressed by Lambertini (2004), who 
shows that optimal macroeconomic stabilization requires either symbiosis or 
task separation if fiscal stabilization creates distortions. Here, however, both 
symbiosis and task separation are requested, where the latter is clearly 




                                                                                                                            
which is studied in a companion paper (see Di Bartolomeo et al. 2005).  
19 See Appendix A.  
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The optimal policy mix with this kind of public entities implies: 




aa b cy bc y
Ey









(10)  () E π π
∗ =    
In this case, the social cost of multiplicative uncertain can be measured in 
terms of output, as  () ( )
1 22 2 22 2 kb c a ab c b c y y µµ σσ
− ∗ ⎛⎞
⎜⎟
⎝⎠ =+ + − . The central 
bank’s loss is clearly zero, whereas that of the government is equal to 
2
Gk θ .  
It is finally worth noticing that monetary and fiscal coordination does not 
solve the multiplicative uncertainty bias. In fact, even if the government and 
the central bank cooperate, they are unable to achieve their common ideal 
values of inflation and real output.
20  
 
4. Welfare analysis 
In the above section we have shown that an ultra-populist government and an 
ultra-conservative central bank minimize the expected values of the 
deviations of inflation and of real output from their ideal values. However, 
minimum averages do not necessary assure welfare loss minimization, if 
welfare is defined in a form similar to that of equations (1), as shown by the 
recent literature.
21  
                                                 
20 The cooperative solution is found by considering the joint minimization of a common loss 
function. However, in our context, the result can be directly verified from equations (7) and 
(8) by setting  12 θ θθ ==. Ideal inflation and real output cannot be achieved for any 
possible value of θ . 
21 See e.g. Woodford (2003) or Lambertini (2004).  
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where  π
∗ ,  y
∗ ,  W θ   are directly derived from the fundamentals of the 
economy.
22  
In equilibrium, equation (11) is:
23  
(12)  [] ( )
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The optimal design of institutions, which is obtained by minimizing the 
above expression (equilibrium expected loss) with respect to the inverses of 



















                                                 
22  This derivation is in Lambertini (2004: Appendix C). Even though we disregard the 
possibly negative effects of the tax (linear) distortions on the micro-founded welfare loss, this 
does not affect our results (See Appendix B). 
23 Equation (11) is not minimized by substituting equations (9) and (10) into it, since E(p)
 2 
and E(y)
 2 are different from E(p
2) and E(y
2). 
24  From the first order conditions, we obtain two pairs of roots, but only the solution 
immediately below (equations (13) and (14)) implies that the 2 by 2 Hessian matrix is 
positive-semi definite: both the determinant and the trace of the Hessian in (13) and (14) is 
positive; the determinant is instead negative and the trace remains positive (an indeterminate 
Hessian matrix and a saddle point) when considering the other solution. Moreover, solution 
(13) and (14) is a global minimum also if the constrains 0 <  G θ < +∞  and 0 <  B θ < +∞  are 
considered (no corner solutions). Computations are available upon request.  
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(14)  0 B θ
∗ =   
The above optimal values for the marginal rates of substitution imply for real 
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According to equations (13) and (14), the minimization of social welfare by 
the fiscal and monetary authorities is sub-optimal. In fact, even if they share 
the same targets, which are the arguments of the social welfare function,  W θ  
is not optimal for  G L  and  B L  (i.e.  GW θ θ
∗ ≠  and  BW θ θ
∗ ≠ ). The result derives 
form the existence of a time consistency problem. Monetary and fiscal 
authorities have to be more conservative than society in order to avoid the 
inflationary temptation and minimize a micro-founded social welfare loss.  
As for the optimal institutional design, equations (13) and (14) require a 
partial division of tasks: the central bank should take care only of inflation 
stabilization, whereas the government should target both real output and 
inflation deviations. However, government conservativeness must be higher 
than the conservativeness of the society in order to avoid the time 
inconsistency problem. Hence, the central bank must be ultraconservative, 
irrespectively of social preferences, whereas the optimal inverse degree of  
  16




In this paper, we have extended a well-known model of fiscal-monetary 
simultaneous interaction to the case in which policy-makers face uncertainty 
on the effects of their policies. By assuming, coherently with the D&L’s 
approach, an unknown multiplicative shock on the effects of fiscal policy, the 
symbiosis result no longer holds, unless the ideal output is equal to its natural 
level. This conclusion is robust with respect to different shock structures and 
order of moves. The difference with the perfect information context is 
produced by a time consistency problem. 
Further results are that an increase in uncertainty raises inflation and reduces 
real output and that., in order to minimize the expected values of the outcome 
deviation from the ideal values, when the policy-makers play simultaneously 
a complete separation of task between monetary and fiscal authorities is 
required: the government should be ultra-populist and the central bank 
ultra-conservative.  
We also showed that under uncertainty the minimization of expected target 
deviations is not equivalent to the minimization of the expected welfare loss: 
the optimal institutional design asks for a government more conservative than 
society, so as to eliminate its inflationary temptation and solve the time 
consistency problem. This result seems to be in line with the architecture of 
the European Monetary Union, based on the Stability and Growth Pact  and  
  17
the ECB primary concern on inflation. It is also consistent with the consensus 
on the need to assign an anti-inflationary priority to central banks, 
irrespectively of the governments’ preferences.  
 
Appendix A 
This appendix contains some equations used in the discussion; all of them can 
be easily derived after tedious algebra.  
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G π  indicates the reaction function of the government and  0
B π  that of 
the central bank.  
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In the Nash equilibrium described in the main text, the derivatives of the 
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where π
∗ ,  y
∗,  W θ ,  W ϑ  are directly derived from the fundamentals of the 
economy.  
The optimal degrees of conservativeness that can be derived after simple 
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The above result confirms the conclusion reached in the main text: the central 
bank should take account of inflation stabilization only, whereas the 
government should target both real output and inflation deviations and adopt 
a degree of conservativeness higher than the social one. By introducing a 
tax-distortion cost in the welfare function, the optimal degree of 
government’s conservativeness should be even higher. The economic 
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